
THE INDEPENDENT

THE AIR FORCE

GENERAL TRENCHARD'S DESPATCH

BOMBING GERMAN TOWNS.

SOME THRILLING NARRATIVES.

A supplement to the *London Gazette* of last night contains a despatch from Major-General H. M. Trenchard, C.O. of the Royal Air Force, giving details of the work of the Independent Force from 5th June to the signing of the Armistice. It is a long and interesting document, and it is regrettable that in *the Times* H. M. Trenchard was requested to contribute an Independent Force to undertake the bombing of industrial centres in Germany.

My first work, writes General Trenchard, was to consider the best arrangements for the accumulation of a Force in the neighbourhood of the English coast. It was necessary to have a larger task than may appear at first sight.

The aerodromes had to carry heavy machines and heavy stores. It was necessary to enable this to be done, drawing water on a large scale had to be provided. The aerodromes had to be arranged to be made for a large installation of electrical power for workshops and lighting and petrol to order to be resupplied.

This work was practically completed by the 1st November. It was within my recollection that in the past I had referred to the necessity for equipment in the neighbourhood of the coast on the Western front with sufficient aircraft to hold and beat the German aerial force. It was a luxury till this had been accomplished, and it was a necessity. This is to say, it became necessary to attack what I may call the vital point in the German position, the vital point—its source of supply; and the Independent Force was formed to do this. It was necessary in order to decide how to use this Force in order to achieve the object—i.e., to destroy the German industrial centres in Germany, its Government, and the crippling of its sources of supply.

ALTERNATIVE SCHEMES.

The two main alternative schemes were—

1. A sustained and continuous attack on each centre was destroyed, and the industrial population was starved at the same time.
2. To attack as many of the large industrial centres as it was possible to reach with the force at the disposal of the Independent Force.

I decided on the latter plan, for the following reasons—

It was not possible with the force at its disposal to do sufficient material damage to so completely destroy the Independent Force in question.

It must be remembered that, even had the Independent Force been larger, it would not have been practised for carry this out unless the force had lasted for at least a month. It was necessary to impose a condition on long-range bombing by the weather.

The weather in June, July, and August was extremely favourable for long-distance bombing, but during September, October, and November the weather was such that it was hardly been worse for this particular work. Day and night attacks were possible, but the long-distance targets, but the wind was generally too strong; or, if there was no wind, the night attacks were not possible, and it was necessary to attack by day. It was necessary to attack by night, which lasted often until ten or eleven o'clock the next morning. On the night attacks were possible, but the day attacks completely obliterated the ground, making it impossible to attack by day.

Besides this, there are always a large number of technical difficulties to overcome which make it impossible to attack by day.

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RESULTS.

By attacking as many centres as could be reached, the Independent Force was able to do much greater work than it was first of all, and it was necessary to attack by night, which lasted often until ten or eleven o'clock the next morning. On the night attacks were possible, but the day attacks completely obliterated the ground, making it impossible to attack by day.

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SOME STATISTICS.

Below are a few interesting figures—

The total weight of bombs dropped between 5th June and 11th November was 150 tons, of which 110 tons were dropped by day and 40 tons by night. Of this amount no less than 120 tons were dropped by day. This large percentage was due to the necessity of preventing the enemy's bombing machines from attacking our aerodromes. It was necessary to attack by night, which lasted often until ten or eleven o'clock the next morning. On the night attacks were possible, but the day attacks completely obliterated the ground, making it impossible to attack by day.

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Births, Marriages, and Deaths (which, in all cases, must be authenticated, 3 lines, 30 words, each additional line of 7 words, 8d.)

Important—The Government has decided to withdraw all restrictions on the mention of British Numbers and the names of the British and Foreign troops, as regards the troops in France, Flanders, Egypt, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Italy, Sardinia and East Africa.

BIRTHS.

COLLIS—December 28, 1914, at Tirrelia, Tipperary, Co. Kerry, to Mr. and Mrs. Stephen David Collis, a daughter.

JACOB—January 1, 1915, at 83 Lower Newry Road, Waterford, to Mr. Dorelton Farrington and T. F. H. Jacob, a son (Louis Connel).

MCGOWAN—December 28, 1914, at 10, Prince's Parading Home, in Waterford, the wife of E. McCarthy, Church av., Templemore, of a son.

MARRIAGES.

CURTIS and BARRINGTON—December 1, 1914, at Howth Park, Co. Dub., by the Rev. J. P. Purcell, Edmund Curtis, Professor, Trinity College, Dublin, to Margaret Leavis, eldest daughter of Richard Barrington, D.L., K.C., Newry.

VAUGHAN and COOK—December 30, 1914, at 10, St. Saviour's, by the Rev. Hugh Mackean, Hon. Cf. assisted by the Rev. Canon J. J. O'Connell, to the Rev. Captain R. M. Vaughan, M.C., and Battalion Royal Irish Infantry Fusiliers, son of the late Mr. and Mrs. Vaughan, and Miss Margaret, to the Rev. to Imeline Estlin, only daughter of Mr. and Mrs. M. J. Estlin, of Newry.

WALMSLEY and STEFF—December 28, 1914, by special licence, at St. Mary's Church, Cavendish Square, by the Rev. J. H. Barry, Canon, to the late Royal Horse Guards, youngest son of the late Mr. and Mrs. Walmsley, of Walsley, Co. Meath, and Alice Maule, youngest daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Maule, of Walsley, Co. Meath.

WEBB and MILLS—December 23, 1918, Castletown Church, by the Very Rev. the Dean Killalea, D. J. G. Webb, Lieutenant, R.A.F. the

DEATHS.

ARLOTT—January 1, 1919, at her residence, 111 Williamsstown, Co. Dublin, Marianne, widow of the late John Arlott, aged 74 years.

BOBBY—December 21, 1918, in London, John Bobby pneumonia, Irene Pauline Batty, youngest daughter, aged 12 years, and Herbert Batty, 13, Ballyhealy, Co. Westmeath.

GRIBSON—At Grange, Enderbury, Katherine, widow of Mark Gribson, 63 years, aged. Buried at Grange, at 2 p.m., to-day (Friday) at Carrick Cemetery.

GOUGH—January 2, 1919, suddenly, at her residence, 10, St. George's, Alice Mary, youngest daughter of late Michael Gough, Ellinstown, R.I. Buried to-day (Friday) from Stauilum at 11 a.m., to St. George's, for burial, Grange, Stauilum.

GRAY—January 2, 1919, at 15 Marlborough

Funeral to Sligo Cemetery, on arrival of 4 p.m. train to-morrow (Saturday), 4th inst.

KENNEY—On New Year's Day, 1918, at New York City, the son of William Kenney, formerly of South Frederick street, and Mary, formerly of 100 West 12th street, from St. Jerome's, Clarendon st., this (Friday) morning, at 8.50 o'clock, at St. Michael's, please copy.

KER—January 3, 1919, at Dr. Stevens' Hospital, New York City, the son of Dr. J. H. Ker, 31 St. Patrick's rd., Drummonds, and Brackington, of New York City, please copy.

MILES—John Joseph Miles, of U.S. 2 Mount Pleasant square, after prolonged illness. Burial in St. Michael's, New York City.

MUNRO—December 23, 1918, at Western Home Hospital, 410 Albany, the son of John Munro (Irish), and my dearly-beloved son of Charles and Johanna Munro, 13 Albany st., Edinburgh.

JOHN—The cause of death was pneumonia.

But it was what's dead gone by There.

REID—December 23, 1918, at St. Corin, Rockings Elm, Great Clacton, Essex, Frances Helen Reid, the dearly-loved wife of Captain Edward H. Reid.

TARLETON—December 7, 1918, at Battle Creek Hospital, Canada, the daughter of John Tarleton, 100 West 12th street, and my dearly-loved wife of Frank J. Tarleton, 100 West 12th street, please copy.

WATSON—On New Year's Day, Frances Watson, nearly-beloved wife of Percy Watson, of St. Nesson's, fourth daughter of the late Francis Albert and Mary

IN MEMORIAM.

BAHNSHER—In sweet remembrance of No. 1442 "Home" January 2, 1954, 111 Randolph ave., Chicago, Ill. *—Mrs. M. J. Baahns.*

BIGLEY—In loving memory of Robert Bigley who fell asleep January 3rd, 1937. With Christ in the home. *—Mother.*

BLACK—Thirtieth Anniversary—January 3, 1954. In fond remembrance, Blackheath, Chertsey, Surrey, England. *—Mrs. M. J. Black.*

GILL—In his death and ever-present memory of my dear wife who entered into rest January 3, 1954. *—Willie.*

MCCORMICK—In loving memory of Evelyn McCormick, who died January 3, 1954, at the home of her daughter, Mrs. J. McCormick, Montpelier, died 2nd January, 1954. *—Mrs. J. McCormick.*

WHARTON—First Anniversary—In loving remembrance of my dear husband, Richard Wharton, died January 3, 1954, at his residence, 8 Kingston rd., Kingston, Ontario. *—Mrs. J. Wharton.*

ANNOUNCEMENTS received late for insertion in
this column will be found on Page 2.

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